E. Beltrami in 1868 did not intend to prove the consistency of non-euclidean plane geometry nor the independence of the euclidean parallel postulate. His approach would have been unsuccessful if so intended. J. Hoüel in 1870 described the relevance of Beltrami's work to the issue of the independence of the euclidean parallel postulate. Hoüel's method is different from the independence proofs using reinterpretation of terms deployed by Peano about 1890, chiefly in using a fixed interpretation for non-logical terms. Comparing the (...) work of Beltrami and Hoüel with the treatment of non-euclidean geometry after the development of the axiomatic method in the 1890s indicates an important shift in mathematicians? attitudes towards mathematical theories. (shrink)

Henry Sheffer’s 1908 Harvard Ph.D. thesis contains an interesting appendix on a central feature of the logical work of his thesis advisor, Josiah Royce. This is the claim in Royce’s 1905 article “The Relations of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry” that an unsymmetric ordering relation can be defined on the single symmetric O-relation for which he gives postulates in that paper. Sheffer criticizes Royce’s specific definition from the point of view of the evolving twentieth century conception (...) of axiomatic method and also shows more generally that an unsymmetric1 order relation cannot be defined in the system of the 1905 paper based on the O-relation. In this article I wish to consider the nature.. (shrink)

Articles by two American mathematicians, E. V. Huntington and Oswald Veblen, are discussed as examples of a movement in foundational research in the period 1900-1930 called American postulate theory. This movement also included E. H. Moore, R. L. Moore, C. H. Langford, H. M. Sheffer, C. J. Keyser, and others. The articles discussed exemplify American postulate theorists' standards for axiomatizations of mathematical theories, and their investigations of such axiomatizations with respect to metatheoretic properties such as independence, completeness, and consistency.

Articles by two American mathematicians, E. V. Huntington and Oswald Veblen, are discussed as examples of a movement in foundational research in the period 1900-1930 called American postulate theory. This movement also included E. H. Moore, R. L. Moore, C. H. Langford, H. M. Sheffer, C. J. Keyser, and others. The articles discussed exemplify American postulate theorists' standards for axiomatizations of mathematical theories, and their investigations of such axiomatizations with respect to metatheoretic properties such as independence, completeness, and consistency.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:September 25, 2010 (2:45 pm) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE3001\russell 30,1 032 red corrected.wpd russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 30 (summer 2010): 69–94 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036-01631; online 1913-8032 eviews RUSSELL VS.z MEINONG, 100 YEARS LATER Michael Scanlan South StraTord, vt 05070, usa [email protected] Nicholas GriUn and Dale Jacquette, eds. Russell vs. Meinong: the Legacy of “On Denoting”. London (...) and New York: Routledge, 2009. Pp. xiii, 384. isbn: 978-0-415-96364-0 (hb); 978-0-203-88802-5 (e-bk). £70.00; us$103.00. The background for the conference in 2005 at McMaster University from which these papers come is a 50-year period in anglophone philosophy during which Russell was portrayed as having put to rest the urge, exempliWed by Meinong, to have an intentional object for every thought. Beginning roughly in the 1970s, analytic philosophers began publishing work more sympathetic to both the speciWcs of Meinong and his general concerns. Some landmark publications in this vein are Terence Parsons, Nonexistent Objects (1980), and Richard Routley, Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond (1980). The development of more sophisticated accounts of Meinong, along with developments in Russell studies, has resulted in a more nuanced presentation of Meinong’s thought in recent literature, including this volume. There is one article in this collection which is explicitly devoted to comparing the views of the historical Russell and Meinong. This is “Psychological Content and Indeterminacy with Respect to Being” by J. C. Marek. The title indicates the two topics examined. Meinong was in the tradition of Brentano in seeing a mental state of presentation (Vorstellungz) as combining a mental act and a mental content. A presentation may or may not also have a presented object. Russell, famously, thought of the state corresponding to Meinong’s presentations as a relation called “direct acquaintance” that comes to exist, or ceases to exist, between a mind and objects. There is no place here for non-existent objects. There is very little to say about Russell’s theory of direct acquaintance and most of that is familiar to English-speaking readers, so Marek rightly devotes himself to expounding Meinong’s views on presentational content. The problem here is whether such content exists. Meinong averred he could introspect such content, and Russell averred that he could not. Beyond such fruitless personal testimony, Meinong oTered arguments for the explanatory value of presentational content. September 25, 2010 (2:45 pm) C:\Users\Milt\Desktop\backup copy of Ken's G\WPData\TYPE3001\russell 30,1 032 red corrected.wpd 70 Reviews One is as an explanation of how we could have presentations (thoughts ofy) nonexistent objects, e.g. the $1,000 in my pocket. Of course, Russell treats this with his theory of descriptions. Another such argument for mental content by Meinong is that it is needed to account for the diTerence in mental state when presented with diTerent objects. Russell says that when the mind is in relation to the distinct objects the distinctness of the objects guarantees two distinct relations of acquaintance. This leaves unclear what the mental diTerence is between seeing a red patch and seeing a blue patch. The separate discussion ofthe Meinong/Mally “indiTerence” of the “pure object ” or object itself as to whether it exists or not is a topic that is canvassed more in the anglophone literature. In Meinong’s 1904 formulation “the present king of France” doesn’t now exist, but if the French have a revolution then a “present ” king of France might exist in 2011. In either case there is an object of thought/reference, and it has (indiTerently) the character (Soseinz) of being king of France. Marek’s exposition in this area focuses on the various technical devices Meinong introduced in 1915 to mitigate the problems caused by allowing for the being of “impossible” objects such as the round square. In “Meditations on Meinong’s Golden Mountain”, Dale Jacquette oTers the traditional dramatic classroom story about Russell and OD. On this account, prior to 1905 Russell is a committed Meinongian who... (shrink)

This article outlines the work of a group of US mathematicians called the American Postulate Theorists and their influence on Tarski's work in the 1930s that was to be foundational for model theory. The American Postulate Theorists were influenced by the European foundational work of the period around 1900, such as that of Peano and Hilbert. In the period roughly from 1900???1940, they developed an indigenous American approach to foundational investigations. This made use of interpretations of precisely formulated axiomatic theories (...) to prove such metatheoretic properties as independence, consistency, categoricity and, in some cases, completeness of axiom sets. This approach to foundations was in many respects similar to that later taken by Tarski, who frequently cites the work of American Postulate Theorists. Their work served as paradigm examples of the theories and concepts investigated in model theory. The article also examines the possibility of a more specific impetus to Tarski's model theoretic investigation, arising from his having studied in 1927???1929 a paper by C. H. Langford proving completeness for various axiom sets for linear orders. This used the method of elimination of quantifiers. The article concludes with an examination of one example of Langford's methods to indicate how their correct formulation seems to call for model-theoretic concepts. (shrink)

Jonathan Lear has suggested that Aristotle attempts to demonstrate a proof-theoretic analogue of a compactness theorem in Posterior analyticsI, chs. 19?22. Aristotle argues in these chapters that there cannot be in finite series of predications of terms. Lear's analysis of Aristotle's arguments are shown to be based on confusions about the nature of infinite orderings. Three distinct confusions are identified. In final remarks, it is suggested that a compactness claim is irrelevant to the issues which motivate Aristotle's arguments.

A case from 1996 in Oregon in which citizens' legally publicmotor vehicle information was disseminated on a World Wide Website is considered. The case evoked widespread moral outrageamong Oregonians and led to changes in the Oregon records laws.The application of either consequentialist ornon-consequentialist moral theories to this and otherinformational privacy cases is found to be inadequate.Adjudication of conflicting desires is offered as the appropriateanalytical model for moral disputes. The notion of adjudicationoffered here diverges from traditional moral theories in itsindeterminate nature.

We present a memorial summary of the professional life and contributions to logic of John Corcoran. We also provide a full list of his many publications.Courtesy of Lynn Corcoran.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 eviews THE DENOTING CENTURY, 1 19 90 05 5– –2 20 00 05 5 Michael Scanlan Philosophy / Oregon State U. Corvallis, or 97331, usa [email protected] Guido Imaguire and Bernard Linsky, eds. On Denoting: 1905–2005. Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2005. Pp. 451. 98.00. isbn 3-88405-091-5. his anniversary collection of papers connected with Russell’s 1905 publiTcation of “On Denoting” reflects both (...) the almost mythic status that paper has achieved in analytic philosophy and the quite variegated nature of the significance that philosophers have seen in it. The papers in this collection break down roughly into two sorts. There are those which take a historical approach and attempt to explicate various aspects of the content of the OD article. The other sort might be labelled “application” papers in which Russell’s analysis in OD is seen as a tool or a model for subsequent philosophical work, in the spirit of Ramsey’s much quoted “paradigm of philosophy” remark. The volume opens with a reprint of the OD text with pagination indicated for the original Mind printing, for the text in Collected Papers 4 and for the widely referenced Logic and Knowledge Russell collection edited by R. C. Marsh. The Mind and Papers texts use the American convention of single quotation marks within double quotation marks. The Marsh edition (and the text given here) uses the inverse British convention. Readers need to be aware that paper authors here, and elsewhere, vary in which text they cite. The end of the volume has a comprehensive 21-page bibliography of the secondary literature. In between there are thirteen papers. I will be rather brief with the “application” papers, since I believe that Russell readers will tend to favour the more historically oriented papers. Some of the application papers wander quite far afield from Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions. For instance the paper by Thomas Mormann on “Description, Construction and Representation from Russell and Carnap to Stone” takes off from Russell’s assertion that his theory of descriptions was an early version of his subsequent interest in substituting “constructions” for “inferred entities” such as space-time points. The paper is almost exclusively a (worthwhile and mathematically astute) analysis of Russell’s efforts along these lines in Our russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies n.s. 26 (winter 2006–07): 167–90 The Bertrand Russell Research Centre, McMaster U. issn 0036-01631 _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 168 Reviews Knowledge of the External World and The Analysis of Matter. The author argues that Russell’s constructions did not actually achieve the effects he wanted, but that (curiously) they can be properly developed within the later framework of topological spaces developed by Marshall Stone in 1937. The paper by Guido Imaguire, “Theory of Descriptions and Inferential Semantics”, explicitly eschews an “exegetical” approach and allies itself with a “systematical approach, in which one analyses possible new features and extensions of the proposed theory” (p. 397). The extension considered here is to “inferential semantics”, especially that of Robert Brandom. The spirit of this approach is to take the semantics of a language to be determined by the set of allowed inferences within that language. Imaguire takes as an essential lesson of Russell’s theory of descriptions that definite descriptions and proper names cannot be treated as singular terms of a language in the same manner. He goes on to argue for a criterion for distinguishing proper names from definite descriptions based on inferences allowed between sentences containing them, and he takes this distinction to argue for a modification of Brandom’s treatment of singular terms in his inferential semantics. Elena Tatievskaya’s paper on “Russell’s Theory of Descriptions and Wittgenstein on Internal Properties of Propositions” is another paper that is mainly about something other than Russell and his theory of descriptions. It is a very detailed study of Wittgenstein’s attempt to make good on his claim that the logical symbols of propositional logic notation, such as v and ~, do not correspond to “logical” components of propositions (Tractatus... (shrink)

History and Philosophy of Logic, Volume 32, Issue 4, Page 405, November 2011.

Although it is eommon to attribute to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus a treatment of general propositions as equivalent to eonjunctions and disjunctions of instance propositions, the evidence for this is not perfeetly clear. This article considers Wittgenstein’s comments in 5.521, which can be read as rejecting such a treatment. It argues that properly situating the Tractatus historically allows for a revised reading of 5.521 and other parts of the Tractatus relevant to Wittgenstein’s theory of generality. The result is that 5.521 (...) does not conflict with the view that general propositions are truth-functions of instance propositions. Common problems with such a view are to some extent obviated by the fact that Wittgenstein, following Russell and Moore, was not concerned with a syntactically defined language, but with propositions conceived as independent of a fixed language. (shrink)

Although it is eommon to attribute to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus a treatment of general propositions as equivalent to eonjunctions and disjunctions of instance propositions, the evidence for this is not perfeetly clear. This article considers Wittgenstein’s comments in 5.521, which can be read as rejecting such a treatment. It argues that properly situating the Tractatus historically allows for a revised reading of 5.521 and other parts of the Tractatus relevant to Wittgenstein’s theory of generality. The result is that 5.521 (...) does not conflict with the view that general propositions are truth-functions of instance propositions. Common problems with such a view are to some extent obviated by the fact that Wittgenstein, following Russell and Moore, was not concerned with a syntactically defined language, but with propositions conceived as independent of a fixed language. (shrink)

Inspired by a 1988 trip to El Salvador, Michael J. Perry's new book is a personal and scholarly exploration of the idea of human rights. Perry is one of our nation's leading authorities on the relation of morality, including religious morality, to politics and law. He seeks, in this book, to disentangle the complex idea of human rights by way of four probing and interrelated essays. * The initial essay, which is animated by Perry's skepticism about the capacity of (...) any secular morality to offer a coherent account of the idea of human rights, suggests that the first part of the idea of human rights--the premise that every human being is "sacred" or "inviolable"--is inescapably religious. * Responding to recent criticism of "rights talk", Perry explicates, in his second essay, the meaning and value of talk about human rights. * In his third essay, Perry asks a fundamental question about human rights: Are they universal? In addressing this question, he disaggregates and criticizes several different varieties of "moral relativism" and then considers the implications of these different relativist positions for claims about human rights. * Perry turns to another fundamental question about human rights in his final essay: Are they absolute? He concludes that even if no human rights, understood as moral rights, are absolute or unconditional, some human rights, understood as international legal rights, are--and indeed, should be--absolute. In the introduction, Perry writes: "Of all the influential--indeed, formative--moral ideas to take center stage in the twentieth century, like democracy and socialism, the idea of human rights is, for many, the most difficult. It is the most difficult in the sense that it is, for many, the hardest of the great moral ideas to integrate, the hardest to square, with the reigning intellectual assumptions of the age, especially what Bernard Williams has called 'Nietzsche's thought': 'There is not only no God, but no metaphysical order of any kind....' For those who accept 'Nietzsche's thought', can the idea of human rights possibly be more than a kind of aesthetic preference? In a culture in which it was widely believed that there is no God or metaphysical order of any kind, on what basis, if any, could the idea of human rights long survive?" The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries will appeal to students of many disciplines, including law, philosophy, religion, and politics. (shrink)

This book is intended for an undergraduate student who has taken one introductory course in first-order logic.1 It focuses on great figures and periods: Aristotle, the Stoics, the medieval logician...

Most readers will consult this volume for one or two of the articles in it. However, reading through the volume as a whole gives an interesting perspective on research in this area. I will briefly...

Legal scholarship exploring the nature of evidence and the process of juridical proof has had a complex relationship with formal modeling. As evident in so many fields of knowledge, algorithmic approaches to evidence have the theoretical potential to increase the accuracy of fact finding, a tremendously important goal of the legal system. The hope that knowledge could be formalized within the evidentiary realm generated a spate of articles attempting to put probability theory to this purpose. This literature was both insightful (...) and frustrating. Much light was shed on the legal system, but it also quickly became evident that the tools of probability theory were in many ways ill-constructed for the task. Fundamental incompatibilities between the structure of legal decision making and the extant formal tools were identified, and it became evident that many of the purported explanations of legal phenomena were internally inconsistent. As a consequence, interest in this type of formal modeling declined, and attention was directed toward different kinds of explanations of the phenomena. Perhaps under the influence of a recent trend toward various types of formal modeling in legal scholarship, a recent burst of articles, rather than attempting to explain the macro structure of trials, which was the previous object of interest, attempts to quantify the probative value of various items of evidence in ways consistent with the formal features of various probability theories, and then to study decision making from that perspective. For example, the value of evidence is often purported to be its likelihood ratio, that is, the probability of discovering or receiving the evidence given a hypothesis (e.g., the defendant did it) divided by the probability of discovering or receiving the evidence given the negation of the hypothesis (the defendant didn't do it). Alternatively, the value of evidence is purported (more contextually) to be the information gain it provides, defined as the increase in probability it provides for a hypothesis above the probability of the hypothesis based on the other available evidence. Both conceptions then assume that all of the various probability assessments conform or ought to conform to the dictates of Bayes' theorem (that maintains consistency among such assessments); empirical studies are then done testing the extent to which this is so and proposing how the law can increase the probability that it is so. The general criticisms of using Bayes' theorem as a formal model of juridical proof are well known and were integral to the last wave of interest in formal modeling of the evidentiary process. This paper thus for the most part puts aside that more general issue, and focuses specifically on mathematical modeling of the value of particular items of evidence. The paper demonstrates that formal modeling has only limited value in explaining the value of legal evidence, much more limited than those constructing and discussing the models assume, and thus that the conclusions they draw about the value of evidence are unwarranted. This is done through a discussion of four recent examples that attempt to quantify evidence relating to, respectively, carpet fibers, infidelity, DNA random-match evidence, and character evidence used to impeach a witness. This article thus makes two contributions. First, and most importantly, it is another demonstration of the complex relationship between algorithmic tools and legal decision making. Second, at a minimum it points out serious pitfalls for analytical or empirical studies of juridical proof. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the inheritance of human handedness and cerebral lateralization within the more general context of structural biological asymmetries. The morphogenesis of asymmetrical structures, such as the heart in vertebrates, depends upon a complex interaction between information coded in the cytoplasm and in the genes, but the polarity of asymmetry seems to depend on the cytoplasmic rather than the genetic code. Indeed it is extremely difficult to find clear-cut examples in which thedirectionof an asymmetry is under genetic control. (...) As one possible case, there is some evidence that the direction, clockwise or counterclockwise, of rotation of the abdomen in certain mutant strains ofDrosophilais controlled by a particular gene locus, although there appears to be some degree of confusion on this point. By contrast, it is much easier to find examples in which thedegreebut not the direction of asymmetry is under genetic control. For instance, there is a mutant strain of mice in which half of the animals displaysitus inversusof the viscera. The proportion has remained at one half despite many years of inbreeding, suggesting that the mutant allele effectively cancels the normalsitusand allows the asymmetry to be specified in random fashion.Although this account does not deny that the right hemisphere of humans may be the more specialized for certain functions, it does attribute a leading or dominant role to the left hemisphere (at least in most individuals). We suggest that so-called “right-hemisphere” functions are essentially acquired by default, due to the left hemisphere's prior involvement with speech and skilled motor acts; we note, for instance, that these right-hemisphere functions include rather elementary perceptual processes. But perhaps the more critical prediction from our account is that the phenomenon of equipotentiality should be unidirectional: the right (lagging) hemisphere should be more disposed to take over left-hemisphere functions following early lesions than is the left (leading) hemisphere to take over right-hemisphere functions. We note preliminary evidence that this may be so. (shrink)

From Greek antiquity to the latest theories, this historical survey of political philosophy not only covers the major thinkers in the field but also explores the theme of how political philosophy relates to the nature of man. It illustrates how the great political thinkers have always grounded their political thought in what the author terms a "normative anthropology," which typically has not only ethical but metaphysical and/or theological components. Starting with the ancient Greek Sophists, author Michael J. White examines (...) how thinkers over the centuries have approached such political and philosophical concerns as justice, morality, and human flourishing, offering substantial studies of--among others--Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, and J. S. Mill. White highlights the impact of Christianity on political philosophy, illustrating the diversity of that impact by studies of Augustine, Aquinas, and Marsilius of Padua. Concluding with an in-depth analysis of John Rawls and contemporary liberal political philosophy, this text blends insight and information in a refreshing and useful manner. A brief Epilogue considers both the value and the limitations of political philosophy and its study. (shrink)

This book offers a broad-based study of Jonathan Edwards as a religious thinker. Much attention has been given to Edwards in relation to his Puritan and Calvinist forebears. McClymond, however, examines Edwards in relation to his eighteenth-century intellectual context. In each of six chapters, he contextualizes and interprets some text or issue in Edwards within the emergent post-Lockean, post-Newtonian culture of the English-speaking world of the 1700s. Among the topics considered are spiritual perception, metaphysics, contemplation, ethics and morality, and apologetics.

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion provides a broad overview of the topics which are at the forefront of discussion in contemporary philosophy of religion. Prominent views and arguments from both historical and contemporary authors are discussed and analyzed. The book treats all of the central topics in the field, including the coherence of the divine attributes, theistic and atheistic arguments, faith and reason, religion and ethics, miracles, human freedom and divine providence, science and religion, and immortality. In addition (...) it addresses topics of significant importance that similar books often ignore, including the argument for atheism from hiddenness, the coherence of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and the relationship between religion and politics. It will be a valuable accompaniment to undergraduate and introductory graduate-level courses. (shrink)

The food industry faces many significant risks from public criticism of corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues in the supply chain. This paper draws upon previous research and emerging industry trends to develop a comprehensive framework of supply chain CSR in the industry. The framework details unique CSR applications in the food supply chain including animal welfare, biotechnology, environment, fair trade, health and safety, and labor and human rights. General supply chain CSR issues such as community and procurement are also considered. (...) Ultimately, the framework serves as a comprehensive tool to support food industry practitioners and researchers in the assessment of strategic and operational supply chain CSR practices. (shrink)

An Essay on Human Action seeks to provide a comprehensive, detailed, enlightening, and (in its detail) original account of human action. This account presupposes a theory of events as abstract, proposition-like entities, a theory which is given in the first chapter of the book. The core-issues of action-theory are then treated: what acting in general is (a version of the traditional volitional theory is proposed and defended); how actions are to be individuated; how long actions last; what acting intentionally is; (...) what doing one thing by doing another is; what basic action is; and what omitting to do something is. Attention is also given to the concepts of causation, intention, volition, deciding, choosing, and trying. Finally, a libertarian account of free action is tentatively proposed and defended. (shrink)

The last decade has witnessed a particularly intensive debate over methodological issues in legal theory. The publication of Julie Dickson's Evaluation and Legal Theory (2001) was significant, as were collective returns to H.L.A. Hart's 'Postscript' to The Concept of Law. While influential articles have been written in disparate journals, no single collection of the most important papers exists. This volume - the first in a three volume series - aims not only to fill that gap but also propose a systematic (...) agenda for future work. The editors have selected articles written by leading legal theorists, including, among others, Leslie Green, Brian Leiter, Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, and William Twining, and organized under four broad categories: 1) problems and purposes of legal theory; 2) the role of epistemology and semantics in theorising about the nature of law; 3) the relation between morality and legal theory; and 4) the scope of phenomena a general jurisprudence ought to address. (shrink)

We discuss a research project that develops and applies algorithms for computational contextual vocabulary acquisition (CVA): learning the meaning of unknown words from context. We try to unify a disparate literature on the topic of CVA from psychology, first- and secondlanguage acquisition, and reading science, in order to help develop these algorithms: We use the knowledge gained from the computational CVA system to build an educational curriculum for enhancing students’ abilities to use CVA strategies in their reading of science texts (...) at the middle-school and college undergraduate levels. The knowledge gained from case studies of students using our CVA techniques feeds back into further development of our computational theory. Keywords: artificial intelligence, knowledge representation, reading, reasoning, science education, vocabulary acquisition. (shrink)

Drawing on conceptual works by Murphy (1999) and Solomon (1999), we develop a virtue ethics scale. Other ethics scales, which are grounded in deontological and teleological principles, may be used to classify people according to their beliefs about (1) the criteria they use to make ethical decisions, or (2) the ethicality of those decisions. We suggest augmenting these scales with our virtue ethics scale, which may be used to classify people according to their beliefs about the virtuous qualities of businesspeople.

Given the widening gap between the number of individuals on transplant waiting lists and the availability of donated organs, as well as the recent plateau in donations based on neurological criteria, there has been a growing interest in expanding donation after circulatory determination of death. While the prevalence of this form of organ donation continues to increase, many thorny ethical issues remain, often creating moral distress in both clinicians and families. In this article, we address one of these issues, namely, (...) the challenges surrounding patient and surrogate informed consent for donation after circulatory determination of death. First we discuss several general concerns regarding consent related to this form of organ donation, and then we address additional issues that are unique to three different patient categories: adult patients with medical decision-making capacity or potential capacity, adult patients who lack capacity, and pediatric patients. (shrink)

One of the most interesting challenges facing paleobiologists is explaining the Cambrian explosion, the dramatic appearance of most metazoan animal phyla in the Early Cambrian, and the subsequent stability of these body plans over the ensuing 530 million years. We propose that because phenotypic variation decreases through geologic time, because microRNAs (miRNAs) increase genic precision, by turning an imprecise number of mRNA transcripts into a more precise number of protein molecules, and because miRNAs are continuously being added to metazoan genomes (...) through geologic time, miRNAs might be instrumental in the canalization of development. Further, miRNAs ultimately allow for natural selection to elaborate morphological complexity, because by reducing gene expression variability, miRNAs increase heritability, allowing selection to change characters more effectively. Hence, miRNAs might play an important role in shaping metazoan macroevolution, and might be part of the solution to the Cambrian conundrum. (shrink)

The workshop “Machine Learning: Prediction Without Explanation?” brought together philosophers of science and scholars from various fields who study and employ Machine Learning (ML) techniques, in order to discuss the changing face of science in the light of ML's constantly growing use. One major focus of the workshop was on the impact of ML on the concept and value of scientific explanation. One may speculate whether ML’s increased use in science exemplifies a paradigmatic turn towards mere pattern recognition and prediction (...) and away from science’s traditional aim of explanation. In contrast, certain conceptions of explanation, such as statistical explanation, could turn out to fit well with the achievements of present-day ML and concede an explanatory value to these achievements after all. It is an open question how to explain ML successes themselves, and this question was in the focus of several talks in the workshop. Based on the topics raised, we will discuss the talks’ contents in more detail as organized into (i) practitioners’ perspectives, (ii) explanations from ML, (iii) explanations of ML, (iv) societal implications, and (v) global and historical perspectives. (shrink)

A common strategy in bioethics is to posit a prima facie case in favour of one policy, and to then claim that the burden of proof falls on those with opposing views. If the burden of proof is not met, it is claimed, then the policy in question should be accepted. This article illustrates, and critically evaluates, examples of this strategy in debates about the sale of organs by living donors, human enhancement, and the precautionary principle. We highlight general problems (...) with this style of argument, and particular problems with its use in specific cases. We conclude that the burden ultimately falls on decision-makers to choose the policy supported by the best reasons. (shrink)

This book contains new essays in honor of Melvin J. Lerner, a pioneer in the psychological study of justice. The contributors to this volume are internationally renowned scholars from psychology, business, and law. They examine the role of justice motivation in a wide variety of contexts, including workplace violence, affirmative action programs, helping or harming innocent victims and how people react to their own fate. Contributors explore fundamental issues such as whether people's interest in justice is motivated by self-interest or (...) a genuine concern for the welfare of others, when and why people feel a need to punish transgressors, how a concern for justice emerges during the development of societies and individuals, and the relation of justice motivation to moral motivation. How an understanding of justice motivation can contribute to the amelioration of major social problems is also examined. (shrink)